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SAGT2010Invited Speakers
SAGT2010 is proud to have the following distinguished scientists for the plenary talks of its scientific program:
SPEAKER 1:

Prof. Amos Fiat 

TITLE: 
When the Players are not Expectation Maximizers


ABSTRACT: 
Much of Game Theory, including the Nash equilibrium concept, is based on
the assumption that players are expectation maximizers. It is known that
if players are risk averse, games may no longer have Nash equilibria
[KS89,Crawford].
We show that

SPEAKER 2:

Prof. Paul W. Goldberg 

TITLE: 
How do you like your equilibrium selection problems? Hard, or very hard?


ABSTRACT: 
The PPADcompleteness of Nash equilibrium computation is taken as
evidence that the problem is computationally hard in the worst case.
This evidence is necessarily rather weak, in the sense that PPAD is only
known to lie "between P and NP", and there is not a strong prospect of
showing it to be as hard as NP.
Of course, the problem of finding an equilibrium that has certain
soughtafter properties should be at least as hard as finding an
unrestricted one, thus we have for example the NPhardness of finding
equilibria that are socially optimal (or indeed 