SAGT2010List of Accepted Papers (ordered by submission numbers)

[Show Abstracts]

• Elchanan Mossel and Omer Tamuz. Truthful Fair Division
• Uriel Feige and Moshe Tennenholtz. Responsive Lotteries
• reshef meir, Yoram Bachrach and Jeffrey Rosenschein. Minimal Subsidies in Expense Sharing Games
• Vincenzo Auletta , Diodato Ferraioli, Francesco Pasquale and Giuseppe Persiano. Mixing Time and Stationary Expected Social Welfare of Logit Dynamics
• Felix Brandt, Felix Fischer and Paul Harrenstein. On the Rate of Convergence of Fictitious Play
• Dimitris Fotakis, George Karakostas and Stavros Kolliopoulos. On the Existence of Optimal Taxes for Network Congestion  Games with Heterogeneous Users
• Chinmay Karande, Gagan Goel and Lei Wang. Single-Parameter Combinatorial Auctions with Partially Public Valuations
• Bharat Adsul, Sobhan Babu, Jugal Garg, Ruta Mehta and Milind Sohoni. Nash Equilibria in Fisher Market
• Yonatan Aumann and Yair Dombb. Pareto Efficiency and Approximate Pareto Efficiency in Routing and Load Balancing Games
• Alexander Skopalik and Martin Hoefer. On the Complexity of Pareto-optimal Nash and Strong Equilibria
• Noam Hazon and Edith Elkind. Complexity of Safe Strategic Voting
• Constantinos Daskalakis , Rafael Frongillo, Christos Papadimitriou , George Pierrakos and Gregory Valiant. On Learning Algorithms for Nash Equilibria
• Pranjal Awasthi, Maria-Florina Balcan, Avrim Blum, Or Sheffet and Santosh Vempala. On Nash-Equilibria of Approximation-Stable Games
• Uriel Feige and Inbal Talgam. A Direct Reduction from k-Player to 2-Player Approximate Nash
• Martin Gairing and Rahul Savani. Computing stable outcomes in hedonic games
• Uri Nadav and Georgios Piliouras. No Regret Learning in Oligopolies: Cournot vs Bertrand
• Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen , Peter Bro Miltersen and Troels Bjerre Sørensen. The computational complexity of trembling hand perfection and other equilibrium refinements
• Bharat Adsul , Sobhan Babu , Jugal Garg , Ruta Mehta and Milind Sohoni. A Simplex-like Algorithm for Fisher Markets
• Matus Mihalak and Jan Christoph Schlegel.  The price of anarchy in network creation games is (mostly) constant
• Vijay Vazirani. 2-Player Nash and Nonsymmetric Bargaining Games: Algorithms and Structural Properties
• Volodymyr Kuleshov and Adrian Vetta. On the Efficiency of Markets with Two-Sided Proportional Allocation Mechanisms
• Elliot Anshelevich , Bugra Caskurlu and Ameya Hate. Partition Equilibrium Always Exists in Resource Selection Games
• Martin Macko, Kate Larson and Ľuboš Steskal. Braess's Paradox for Flows Over Time
• Gagan Goel and Vijay Vazirani. A Perfect Price Discrimination Market Model with Production,  and a (Rational) Convex Program for it
• Alex Fabrikant, Aaron D. Jaggard and Michael Schapira. On the Structure of Weakly Acyclic Games
• Vittorio Bilo , Ioannis Caragiannis , Angelo Fanelli and Gianpiero Monaco. Improved lower bounds on the price of stability of undirected network design games
• Bart de Keijzer , Guido Schaefer and Orestis Telelis. On the Inefficiency of Equilibria in Linear Bottleneck Congestion Games
• Rajgopal Kannan and Costas Busch. Bottleneck Congestion Games with Logarithmic Price of Anarchy