Accepted Papers (ordered by
- Elchanan Mossel and Omer Tamuz.
Truthful Fair Division
- Uriel Feige and Moshe Tennenholtz. Responsive
- reshef meir, Yoram Bachrach and Jeffrey
Rosenschein. Minimal Subsidies in Expense
- Vincenzo Auletta , Diodato Ferraioli, Francesco
Pasquale and Giuseppe Persiano. Mixing Time
and Stationary Expected Social Welfare of Logit Dynamics
- Felix Brandt, Felix Fischer and Paul Harrenstein.
On the Rate of Convergence of Fictitious
- Dimitris Fotakis, George Karakostas and Stavros
Kolliopoulos. On the Existence of Optimal
Taxes for Network Congestion Games with Heterogeneous Users
- Chinmay Karande, Gagan Goel and Lei Wang.
Single-Parameter Combinatorial Auctions with Partially Public
- Bharat Adsul, Sobhan Babu, Jugal Garg, Ruta Mehta
and Milind Sohoni. Nash Equilibria in Fisher Market
- Yonatan Aumann and Yair Dombb.
Pareto Efficiency and Approximate Pareto Efficiency
in Routing and Load Balancing Games
- Alexander Skopalik and Martin Hoefer. On the
Complexity of Pareto-optimal Nash and Strong Equilibria
- Noam Hazon and Edith Elkind. Complexity of Safe Strategic Voting
- Constantinos Daskalakis , Rafael Frongillo,
Christos Papadimitriou , George Pierrakos and Gregory Valiant.
On Learning Algorithms for Nash Equilibria
- Pranjal Awasthi, Maria-Florina Balcan, Avrim
Blum, Or Sheffet and Santosh Vempala. On Nash-Equilibria of
- Uriel Feige and Inbal Talgam. A Direct
Reduction from k-Player to 2-Player Approximate Nash
- Martin Gairing and Rahul Savani. Computing
stable outcomes in hedonic games
- Uri Nadav and Georgios Piliouras.
No Regret Learning in Oligopolies: Cournot vs
- Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen , Peter Bro Miltersen
and Troels Bjerre Sørensen. The
computational complexity of trembling hand perfection and other
- Bharat Adsul , Sobhan Babu , Jugal Garg , Ruta
Mehta and Milind Sohoni. A Simplex-like Algorithm for Fisher
- Matus Mihalak and Jan Christoph Schlegel.
The price of anarchy in network creation games is (mostly)
- Vijay Vazirani. 2-Player
Nash and Nonsymmetric Bargaining Games: Algorithms and Structural
- Volodymyr Kuleshov and Adrian Vetta. On the
Efficiency of Markets with Two-Sided Proportional Allocation
- Elliot Anshelevich , Bugra Caskurlu and Ameya
Hate. Partition Equilibrium Always Exists in Resource Selection
- Martin Macko, Kate Larson and Ľuboš Steskal.
Braess's Paradox for Flows Over Time
- Gagan Goel and Vijay Vazirani.
A Perfect Price Discrimination Market Model with
Production, and a (Rational) Convex Program for it
- Alex Fabrikant, Aaron D. Jaggard and Michael
Schapira. On the Structure of Weakly Acyclic Games
- Vittorio Bilo , Ioannis Caragiannis , Angelo
Fanelli and Gianpiero Monaco. Improved
lower bounds on the price of stability of undirected network design
- Bart de Keijzer , Guido Schaefer and Orestis
Telelis. On the Inefficiency of Equilibria
in Linear Bottleneck Congestion Games
- Rajgopal Kannan and Costas Busch.
Bottleneck Congestion Games with Logarithmic Price of